> ## Documentation Index
> Fetch the complete documentation index at: https://docs.walletwall.org/llms.txt
> Use this file to discover all available pages before exploring further.

# Readiness Packet

> What a shared readiness packet is, what it is not, and how to verify one yourself

A **readiness packet** is a dated, versioned, read-only snapshot of one wallet's
stablecoin vault-readiness assessment — the artifact you can hand to a treasury
committee, a DAO forum, or a due-diligence thread. It travels as a link:

```
https://vault.walletwall.org/packet#<encoded packet>
```

## What a packet is — and is not

* It **is** a self-describing summary: recommendation, score band, risk drivers,
  evidence references, data-freshness stamps, generation time, and WalletWall's
  boundary statements embedded in the data itself.
* It **is not an endorsement**, attestation, or certification of the wallet it
  describes, and it is never a custody, insurance, or return claim. Readiness
  signals are research heuristics. A packet with a missing score honestly reads
  "insufficient evidence" — never zero.
* Boundary statements are non-strippable: a payload without them is rejected as
  invalid by the packet page.

## The privacy model

Everything after the `#` is a **URL fragment**. Fragments are never sent in HTTP
requests, so the packet content — including the wallet address — never reaches
WalletWall's servers, CDN logs, or analytics when a link is opened. Analytics
page-view URLs additionally redact any payload-sized fragment. Sharing a link is
still publishing: anyone holding it can read the packet. A "share without
address" variant is issued separately for redacted sharing.

## Two independent checks

Every issued packet carries two verifiable properties:

**1. Integrity — the content hash (`evidence.reportHash`).**
SHA-256 over the packet's canonical JSON: recursively key-sorted, no
insignificant whitespace, with `evidence.reportHash` set to `null` and the
`issuerSignature` field removed before hashing. To verify independently:
download the packet JSON, apply those two exclusions, canonicalize, hash, and
compare. A mismatch usually means a truncated link — ask for the JSON file.

**2. Authenticity — the issuer signature (`issuerSignature`).**
An **ECDSA P-256** signature over the same canonical bytes (with only
`issuerSignature` removed), created by WalletWall's server when it derived the
packet from its own scheduled data. Verify against WalletWall's published
packet-signing public key. The hash alone proves a link wasn't corrupted;
only the signature proves WalletWall issued the content. The packet page
renders the full presentation **only** when the signature verifies — unsigned
or altered payloads get a warning and the raw JSON, nothing more.

## Fail-closed by design

Issuance is server-side only and fail-closed: a deployment without a signing
key answers 503 and never issues an unsigned packet. Clients ship without a
pinned verification key until one is published, and until then treat every
payload as unverified. Signed still does not mean endorsed — the signature
proves WalletWall's server derived the content from its data at the stated
time, nothing more.