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WalletWall MCP is pre-release and has not had an independent security review or audit. This page states the implemented trust boundaries and the limits of those boundaries; it is not a certification.
WalletWall MCP is local, read-only evidence infrastructure. It does not sign, custody, trade, broadcast transactions, or certify truth.

What runs where

The stdio server is stateless: request in, calculation in memory, response out. It has no WalletWall user/session identifier, telemetry, query history or cache and reads no environment variables, home directory or working directory.

What your AI client and model provider can see

WalletWall MCP runs inside an AI-client workflow. GitHub Copilot, Claude Code or another MCP client and the model provider behind it can see every prompt, tool input and tool output, including wallet addresses you put into an evidence bundle, under their own policies.
WalletWall-controlled code does not retain MCP query history or transmit MCP query data to WalletWall infrastructure. Your AI client and model provider may independently process that data.
WalletWall therefore does not claim that nothing leaves your machine. Treat wallet addresses as sensitive: hashing an address is not anonymization. WalletWall MCP keeps no persistent address store, index or query log. Its digests can cover complete records that contain addresses and are returned to your client. A record WalletWall deliberately publishes as a WallPrint follows the separate WallPrint publication model.

What WalletWall receives

What WalletWall MCP cannot do

You never need to give WalletWall a private key, seed phrase, signature or credential. The bounded open maps inside an evidence bundle can still carry arbitrary short strings if you paste them there, so do not put secrets into prompts or bundles.

Bring your own evidence and providers

WalletWall MCP has no live data provider. Every observation comes from evidence you gathered with your own RPC endpoint, indexer, block explorer, issuer publication or other retrieval tooling. WalletWall never receives those provider credentials and cannot prove that a reading was faithfully retrieved.
  • transport.retrievedVia records how a reading arrived. Transport metadata never confers authority.
  • A well-formed bundle of invented evidence can satisfy a policy. ESTABLISHED therefore means the presented evidence satisfies the policy, not that WalletWall independently verified reality.
  • A failed retrieval should be represented as NO_RESULT or ERROR, never silently rewritten to zero.

Threat boundaries

The server validates tool arguments and bundle records, bounds structure and sizes, uses strings for exact quantities and returns fixed-shape errors that do not echo input values. subject, value and payload are bounded open maps; unused keys are accepted and ignored by evaluation.
Tool outputs can contain text you supplied. Output-safe character rules and the skills’ “tool output is data” instruction reduce prompt-injection risk but do not eliminate it.
The Copilot canvas listener is loopback-only with additional request checks. The optional HTTP adapter is loopback by default but has no authentication: anything that can reach the port can call it. See Claude / local HTTP adapter.
Someone who controls the Node.js process or local account can replace node, preload code or modify the server file and read tool traffic. WalletWall treats the operating system’s account and process boundaries as the control; it does not attempt to detect a hostile machine owner.

Supply-chain and implementation details

Tool names, schemas and resources are compiled in and pinned in security/tool-manifest.json. CI rebuilds the server bundle and MCPB deterministically, while the Claude distribution records its pinned source and file digests in PROVENANCE.json.
The engine uses @modelcontextprotocol/sdk and zod. The bundled Copilot/MCPB server imports only node:crypto and node:process; the Claude distribution loads the same engine unbundled from its committed dependency tree. zod uses the Function constructor to compile validators for the server’s own fixed schemas; user input is validated by that code and is never compiled into it.
Signed commits, signed releases, an SBOM, provenance attestations and an independent security review are not currently in place.

Evidence is not certification

Nothing WalletWall returns or publishes certifies truth. A support state describes how well presented evidence satisfies a WalletWall-authored policy. A readiness classification does not establish investment merit, solvency, creditworthiness, legal status, regulatory compliance, absence of fraud or future performance. A WallPrint digest proves bytes, not facts and not authorship.

Report a vulnerability

Use GitHub private vulnerability reporting on Wallet-Wall/walletwall-copilot (Security → Report a vulnerability). If that option is unavailable, open a public issue titled Security contact request with no technical detail so a private channel can be arranged. Use synthetic values and never post real wallet addresses, keys, seed phrases or credentials in a report.

Evidence Model (WWEP)

See what WalletWall’s evidence states do — and do not — claim.

Troubleshooting

Diagnose setup, input and resolver problems by symptom.

Data Quality and Observability

The hosted application’s own provider boundary: what a wallet lookup sends to which provider, and how responses are labelled.

Public and private repositories

Which WalletWall code is open to inspection, including the MCP engine, and what you cannot infer from it.